

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Polygraph Utility Study

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

7 May 1985

Chief, Polygraph Division

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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D/S

7 MAY 1985

Attached is a copy of the Polygraph Utility Study that

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DIRECTOR  
OF  
CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE

*SECURITY COMMITTEE*

## **POLYGRAPH UTILITY STUDY**

February 1984

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## **POLYGRAPH UTILITY STUDY**

This report was prepared for the Director of Central Intelligence by the Personnel Security Subcommittee of the DCI Security Committee, comprised of representatives from all Intelligence Community agencies.

The report contains 49 anecdotal accounts of personnel security cases in which polygraph testing produced data of vital security importance which was not otherwise obtainable through the standard full field investigation. It cites actual cases of attempts by foreign intelligence services to penetrate the Intelligence Community; of individuals who successfully underwent screening by conventional means and subsequently were found by the polygraph to have abused the trust placed in them; and of instances in which the polygraph uncovered serious character defects in persons who otherwise would have been cleared for the Nation's most sensitive secrets.

This report addresses only the personnel security benefits of the polygraph. The issue of scientific reliability has been addressed by other elements of the Intelligence Community. The sole purpose of this report is to demonstrate that polygraph testing is effective in obtaining information bearing significantly on the national security, and that major damage to national security has been averted through polygraph testing. The cases cited herein were contributed by the Intelligence Community agencies which use the polygraph. Most of the cases occurred during the January 1980-September 1983 period, with a few of major significance drawn from earlier years. Cases included represent only a sampling of a larger body of evidence supporting the utility of the polygraph.

The report is formatted to disguise the identities of the subjects, and to sanitize data on sensitive intelligence sources and methods and specifics on contributing agencies. The report was prepared specifically for use by the Intelligence Community in hearings on use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes and is not intended for release to the general public. Should the report be publicized extensively, the privacy rights of individuals could be jeopardized.

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**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY****82-4913****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was a former member of the U.S. military, where he had access to classified information. He had been favorably investigated in conjunction with his prior military service. Subject was given an applicant screening polygraph examination and showed deception in response to the question relating to intent to commit espionage or sabotage against the United States. He made no admissions. During a reexamination, deception was also noted on questions about clandestine contacts with representatives of a foreign country. Subject then admitted that he would sell classified information to a foreign power if it would guarantee him a comfortable living. He continually denied ever having committed espionage, having clandestine contacts, or actually having a specific intent or plan to commit espionage. Deception was still indicated, however, to questions regarding intent to commit espionage against the United States and to having had clandestine contacts with agents of foreign powers.

**82-5802****DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a TOP SECRET cleared U.S. citizen on active military duty assigned to an Intelligence Community organization, was polygraphed in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. During a series of polygraph examinations over a two-week period, Subject admitted that he had provided classified information to a foreign security service without authorization; had taken classified information to his residence on several occasions; and had taken uncleared friends to his place of employment to explain the classified mission and functions of the installation. Subject also revealed he had been stealing office supplies since 1972, some of which he had sold, and admitted taking money from office funds and from the desks of co-workers.

**83-5084****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was given a polygraph examination. When deception was indicated regarding counterintelligence questions, she admitted that while overseas she was cultivated by the host country intelligence service. The local service proposed that she travel to a third country as a U.S. citizen under a false identity, and obtain employment in the target country to gather information. She was to receive training in intelligence tradecraft. Subject said that after two days of thoughtful deliberation, she declined the host country's offer. She had not previously reported this to U.S. authorities.

**83-5122****COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, listed on his security forms foreign

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travel to a communist-bloc country in conjunction with previous employment. During a polygraph examination he admitted that during the trip, in the company of Communist country nationals, he was drugged and an attempt was made to have him engage in a homosexual act. Later, the intelligence service of that country requested him to work for them. Although Subject claimed he refused, he never reported this entrapment attempt or offer to any U.S. official. He continued to show deception on the polygraph examination.

**82-6580****DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a U.S. citizen, was employed in the Intelligence Community in 1980 and granted a TOP SECRET clearance following security processing which was favorable except for minor illegal drug use. She was warned against further drug use at that time. Subject received a routine reinvestigation polygraph in 1983 and admitted to having used marijuana since beginning her employment. Polygraph examination raised doubts about the truthfulness of her admissions. She also admitted to identifying classified sites to an Iranian national whom she dated and discussing her impending foreign assignment with him.

**81-8302****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was suspected of having contact with the embassy of a hostile country. Although many indicators of espionage were evident, a lengthy investigation, complete with a complex surveillance, failed to produce hard evidence of espionage. During a personal interview, Subject denied all allegations. Subject submitted to a polygraph examination and deception was noted concerning contact with a hostile intelligence service and passage of classified information. Subject subsequently admitted to contacting the hostile service, collecting a large quantity of highly classified information and passing it to that hostile service in exchange for money. The polygraph was also used to ascertain what information had been compromised.

**83-5333****CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, stated on his security forms that he had not used any illegal drugs or narcotics. During his initial polygraph examination, Subject admitted only to limited drug use but showed deception in the area of serious crimes. He later admitted to theft of merchandise and pilferage from employers and to shoplifting the month prior to the polygraph examination. After further testing, Subject also admitted to expanded drug use.

**81-4807****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, had undergone a background investigation in connection with an earlier assignment. Personal biographic data was favorable. During the applicant screening polygraph examination, Subject admitted

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that while serving with U.S. forces overseas he lived for more than a year with and was partly supported by a woman known to him as an agent of a foreign intelligence service. Subject observed in her apartment a transmitter/receiver which was apparently for clandestine use. He had not reported any of this information to military intelligence authorities.

**77-1500**

**ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a member of the U.S. military, was one of five individuals employed in a communications center from which highly classified information on sensitive DOD, State and White House matters was being illegally provided to a foreign intelligence service. All suspects held TOP SECRET clearances and Sensitive Compartmented Information approvals. Conventional investigative procedures failed to identify the guilty party. When polygraph testing of the Subject indicated deception, he admitted to working for a foreign intelligence service and to supplying a great quantity of information to that service. Polygraph testing of the remaining suspects did not reveal deception.

**82-0758**

**DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a TOP SECRET cleared U.S. citizen and long-time employee of an Intelligence Community organization, was polygraphed in conjunction with his periodic reinvestigation. During the polygraph examination, subject admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to news media personalities over a period of ten years.

**83-7752**

**CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for TOP SECRET employment with an Intelligence Community organization, underwent a background investigation which was completed with favorable results. During a subsequent polygraph examination, Subject admitted that he had purchased and sold illegal drugs and had been involved in other criminal activities, including theft, insurance fraud, arson, and receipt of stolen goods.

**83-4500**

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community foreign language translator position requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, was investigated with favorable results. During a subsequent polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception on questions regarding contact with a foreign intelligence service and the truthfulness of his application for employment. Subject admitted that attempts had been made by a hostile intelligence service to recruit him prior to leaving his country of origin and by another foreign intelligence service while en route to the United States. He also admitted omitting pertinent data on his employment application.

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81-4900

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was given a polygraph examination. Subject admitted various radical and Marxist connections, including residence with a British Communist Party member while both were students at a British university. He acknowledged visiting the Soviet Union twice on British student tours, and, during his initial tour, becoming particularly friendly with a young woman described as a student and a part-time INTOURIST guide. She was also his tour guide on the second trip. He said he later corresponded with her and informed her that he had applied for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies. Shortly thereafter, she came to the U.S., supposedly to visit relatives. She contacted Subject and arranged to meet him the day after his polygraph examination. After admitting to this forthcoming meeting, Subject continued to show deception to counterintelligence questions during the polygraph examination. While Subject denied that he had ever been approached to engage in espionage, he indicated deception on questions regarding additional knowledge of individuals involved in espionage against the United States.

82-0252

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor on a TOP SECRET project, required security processing for access to another TOP SECRET project. During a polygraph examination, Subject admitted that he furnished classified information and industrial proprietary information to foreign nationals of both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

83-7950

## CRIMINAL CONDUCT

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community and a former member of the U.S. military, provided intelligence information of questionable validity about planned terrorist activity at two U.S. military installations, which purported to include the theft of military weapons. Subject was given a polygraph examination and was found deceptive. Upon further questioning, he admitted that he fabricated the story of planned terrorist activity and reported it to gain recognition. Subject also admitted to unrelated contact with hostile intelligence services to discuss military and cultural matters as well as possible defection.

81-4918

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a SECRET-cleared U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor, needed his clearance upgraded for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. During his polygraph examination, Subject showed deception to questions about involvement in intelligence work for a foreign government, espionage activity, intent to commit espionage against the United States, the accuracy of his biographic data and other related questions. Subject admitted that he falsely reported an academic affiliation during two tours abroad, totalling eight years. He admitted that during those years he actually served as a scientific advisor to the chief of a foreign military intelligence service. He reported directly to the head of military intelligence of the foreign power. Al-

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though Subject admitted that he might, in the future, pass classified information to that foreign service, he claimed that he had never done so. He had never revealed his foreign intelligence connection to his employer or to the cognizant government security officer. Subject was still in contact with the foreign intelligence service, though legitimately so through his U.S. contractor employment. Subject continued to show deception to questions about giving or selling classified information to the foreign intelligence service.

**82-0769****COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES**

Subject, a staff employee of an Intelligence Community agency, admitted during polygraph examination to a wide variety of homosexual activities with foreign nationals overseas. He also admitted that an East Asian national with whom he had lived in a homosexual relationship was blackmailing him for money. Subject acknowledged disclosing his classified intelligence affiliation to the blackmailer.

**82-4801****DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed on a classified contract requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, had previously worked for the U.S. government and held a TOP SECRET clearance. He had been favorably investigated for his prior government position. As part of his processing for a TOP SECRET clearance as a contractor employee, Subject was given a polygraph examination. He showed deception to questions pertaining to unauthorized disclosure of classified information. He admitted divulging classified information to friends, co-workers, and family members. He had held a classified slide show for friends and family and also provided classified information to a foreign national. Subject indicated deception to questions concerning his intent to commit espionage and/or sabotage against the United States. He threatened to divulge classified information if he was denied a clearance. During his final polygraph examination, Subject continued to show deception regarding his intention to commit espionage against the United States.

**83-3900****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen and an applicant for a sensitive Intelligence Community position as a foreign language translator, provided the required biographical data and was favorably investigated. There was no indication in his declarations or during the background investigation of any contact with a foreign intelligence service. During polygraph testing, Subject admitted that a family member had in fact been a member of such a service. Testing did not support his statement that this was his only foreign intelligence affiliation. During subsequent interrogation and testing, Subject made increasingly more damaging admissions about his recent work for known members of a foreign intelligence service.

**82-0513****CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community with access to TOP SECRET information, was given a polygraph examination in conjunction with



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his reinvestigation. During the examination, Subject admitted that he had shoplifted and changed price tags on merchandise. He further admitted to accepting gratuities from contractors and to providing classified information to uncleared contractors to assist them in their bidding.

**83-7750**

**ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a member of the U.S. military who was known to have had contact with a foreign intelligence service, was arrested while selling classified material to undercover Federal Agents. During interrogation, Subject denied additional contact with hostile intelligence services and admitted no additional security infractions. During a polygraph examination, Subject was found deceptive on both topics. He subsequently admitted further liaison with a hostile intelligence service and possession of additional classified documents at his residence.

**83-3800**

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES**

Subject, a U.S. citizen, applied for a sensitive Intelligence Community position as an intelligence research specialist. His investigation raised questions regarding his associates and travel in a Soviet Bloc country. When these issues were discussed during a pre-polygraph interview, Subject maintained that he had no contact with foreign intelligence representatives. When polygraph testing showed deception, Subject admitted associating with persons he believed to represent a hostile intelligence service and having visited a foreign embassy on occasion, most recently a week prior to his examination. Although he declared he had nothing more to admit, further testing indicated deception. He later admitted additional contact with Soviet Bloc embassies during his overseas travel.

**82-0277**

**DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position, had been cleared previously for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). During polygraph testing, he admitted to the unauthorized disclosure of SCI on many occasions to associates and family members. Previous investigations had given no indication of such disclosures by him.

**82-5683**

**ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was serving in the U.S. military and had access to sensitive cryptologic information. During the applicant screening polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception. In the post-test interview, he admitted to various petty crimes. The polygraph examiner noted continued specific reactions to relevant questions. When the Subject was reexamined several weeks later, the same reactions continued. His access was withdrawn and an investigation opened. During the investigation, Subject was found dead in his automobile. It was subsequently determined that he had been engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY****82-0712****CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

Subject, a TOP SECRET cleared U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community, received a polygraph examination in conjunction with his periodic reinvestigation. During the examination, Subject admitted to falsification of reports, fraudulent accounting practices, improper handling of classified material and serious drug abuse.

**83-3700****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was favorably investigated for a sensitive Intelligence Community clerical position. There were no indications in his personal history statement of association with a foreign intelligence service. Initial polygraph testing indicated that Subject failed to list a previous employment at a foreign embassy in his country of origin, and that he was related by marriage to a member of a foreign national police force. During subsequent testing, Subject was also found to be deceptive on current work for a foreign intelligence service and on instructions by a foreign intelligence service to seek U.S. Government employment.

**83-5096****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, had been favorably investigated for an earlier U.S. intelligence assignment. All personal biographic data were favorable. During a polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception to questions about knowing others engaged in espionage, intent to engage in espionage, and the truthfulness of the information on his security forms. During the post-test interview he admitted that he had been terminated from his employment with a U.S. intelligence service after a year of training but before he was assigned to a position. He admitted that he engaged in freelance journalism in the U.S. and abroad with an Asian. During their work, the Asian told him he was an intelligence agent for his country. Although the Subject identified the agent by name, his U.S. location, and his intelligence service, he would not give details of their joint activities and continued to show deception about intending to commit espionage against the United States.

**81-4000****COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position as a foreign language translator, was favorably investigated for a TOP SECRET clearance. During his polygraph examination, he declared that he had no contact with officials of foreign intelligence services and denied that he had been directed by any such service to seek Intelligence Community employment. Testing showed deception on these issues. Subject subsequently admitted that prior to leaving his country of origin, officials of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service contacted him in a recruitment attempt.

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82-7700

## LOSS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subject was one of three military personnel with direct access to approximately one thousand classified aperture cards, which were reported missing. An investigation was initiated and all three individuals denied culpability. Each was then given a polygraph examination. No deception was indicated by two of the individuals, but Subject's polygraph examination indicated deception. When questioned further, he admitted that he had deliberately destroyed the aperture cards because of inventory and filing problems. Additional polygraph testing gave no indication that the missing cards had been compromised.

71-1650

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a non-U.S. citizen, was one of two hostile espionage agents put ashore in a country friendly to the United States. Subject survived a fire fight and was subsequently interrogated for almost a year before being turned over to U.S. Intelligence for additional questioning. The friendly country, without polygraph, had accepted his statements and elaborate cover legend. U.S. intelligence interrogation, using the polygraph, penetrated Subject's cover and eventually was instrumental in eliciting positive intelligence concerning important military installations in the Subject's home country.

82-0071

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a U.S. citizen who divided his employment career between two agencies within the Intelligence Community where he had access to TOP SECRET information, required security processing for detail to a third intelligence organization. During polygraph testing, Subject admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information (e.g. data on U.S. technical collection capabilities) to Soviet intelligence and involvement in a homosexual act in Soviet controlled space in the USSR.

82-0263

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community and holding a TOP SECRET clearance, received a polygraph interview in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. He admitted to operational security indiscretions and sexual misconduct with a foreign national overseas. He continued to show deception to counterintelligence questions.

80-2501

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a foreign national, was employed in a friendly foreign country in a non-sensitive position with an Intelligence Community agency. His position gave him access to biographic data on and travel plans of senior U.S. personnel abroad. His father was employed in a non-sensitive position with a U.S. Intelligence agency in his

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homeland, Poland. During normal debriefing interviews, Subject admitted several contacts with representatives of the Polish intelligence service but denied cooperation with them. He appeared forgetful and evasive on this issue. The polygraph showed deception regarding the contact issue. When confronted, Subject admitted to greater contact with, recruitment by, and cooperation with the Polish intelligence service. He attributed his cooperation to his family's hostage situation in Poland. As a result of his admissions, Subject was terminated from his position.

82-0614

**CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community, was arrested for petty theft. During polygraph examination administered by his Community employer, he admitted to skimming \$7500 from operational funds, in addition to extensive shoplifting.

82-0274

**DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a U.S. citizen holding a TOP SECRET clearance with 20 years' Intelligence Community experience, underwent a periodic reinvestigation polygraph examination. He admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to non-U.S. citizens, including a foreign liaison official.

83-4300

**ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for a foreign language translator position in the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance. He was polygraphed and found to be deceptive in response to questions regarding his claimed membership in organizations and his claim that none of his relatives was employed by or was cooperating with any hostile intelligence service. When questioned further about his relatives and their cooperation with hostile intelligence services, Subject terminated the interview without making any admissions.

83-4972

**DRUG USE**

Subject, a member of the U.S. military, applied for a civilian position in the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance. A background investigation had been conducted in conjunction with his military service. Prior to his polygraph examination, Subject admitted minor use of marijuana and hashish. He reported identical information to a staff psychologist during his employment processing. During the polygraph examination, he admitted to heavy use of marijuana, in addition to repeated use of hashish, "speed", and quaaludes while in the military between 1978 and 1982; to purchasing these drugs for his personal use; and on several occasions to selling small amounts to finance his own drug use. He admitted that he falsified his application forms and lied to the staff psychologist to enhance his prospects for employment.

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83-5057

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a U.S. contractor employee requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was given a polygraph examination. When the test indicated deception to questions concerning espionage, Subject admitted that her former husband was engaged in espionage against the U.S. for a foreign intelligence service. These activities spanned several years while her former spouse held various positions with the U.S. government and with defense contractors requiring classified access. Subject provided very specific details on espionage activities.

83-4100

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for a sensitive investigative position in the Intelligence Community. A complete background investigation for a TOP SECRET clearance failed to disclose any unfavorable information. During a pre-polygraph interview, Subject admitted to providing non-intelligence information to a Far Eastern intelligence service. The polygraph examination indicated deception in that area. During subsequent interrogation Subject confessed to gathering intelligence information for a Far Eastern intelligence service.

82-4811

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a member of the U.S. military, applied for a position in the Intelligence Community requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). He had been favorably investigated for SCI access while in the military. During the polygraph examination, Subject was found deceptive to questions concerning espionage against the United States. He then described several visits to the Soviet embassy to make arrangements to defect. He admitted that embassy officials obtained extensive biographic information on him, retained copies of his documents, and upon learning of his pending applications for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies, encouraged him to remain in the U.S.

82-5665

## DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community, was investigated and polygraphed in connection with her initial assignment in 1974. She was cautioned in 1976 to heed regulations against taking classified information home. She was cautioned again in 1977 when it was determined that she had discussed SECRET information with her husband, a foreign-born naturalized U.S. citizen. Reinvestigation polygraph examinations elicited admissions of additional significant unauthorized disclosures and the fact that, between 1976 and 1980, her spouse acted as an attorney for the Soviet Embassy, where his principal contact was a KGB officer. Subject continued to show deception in response to questions regarding unauthorized disclosures.

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## CRIMINAL CONDUCT

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position in the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was employed as an engineer by another government agency. During his polygraph examination, he admitted that the engineering degree he listed in his biographic data was phony and had been purchased in London through the mail for \$100. Subject also admitted that he shot and wounded his second wife and served two years in prison for this offense. (He did not list his prison term on his biographic data form.) His present wife was missing under unusual circumstances, which he refused to explain. Subject continued to show deception to questions regarding additional involvement in criminal activity.

83-8303

## ESPIONAGE

Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was alleged by a superior officer to have passed classified information to a member of a hostile intelligence service. During a personal interview, Subject admitted only to passing one piece of classified data to a representative of that country. When polygraph results indicated deception, Subject admitted giving a substantial number of classified items to that representative, who proved to be a member of his country's intelligence service.

83-4400

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Subject, a non-U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position as a foreign language translator, was favorably investigated for a TOP SECRET clearance. During a pre-polygraph interview, Subject denied that he had been in contact with representatives of a hostile Middle Eastern intelligence service. His polygraph charts showed him to be deceptive to questions regarding such contact. After further questioning, Subject admitted that while he was employed as a contractor for a U.S. intelligence service, he had contacts with members of this hostile intelligence service. Subject never reported this information to his employer or to U.S. authorities.

83-6065

## EXCESSIVE USE OF ALCOHOL

Subject, an applicant for employment with an Intelligence Community organization, was favorably investigated and cleared for limited access to classified information. During a polygraph examination he admitted discussing with friends and relatives classified information pertaining to sensitive sites and missions. He also acknowledged stealing from his previous employers over a ten year period. Testing further disclosed that alcohol consumption affected his personal and professional life style and that he had been unable to work on five occasions and blacked out weekly due to excessive drinking.

83-7375

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position in the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was favorably investigated. Polygraph testing

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surfaced an issue of divided loyalty. Subject claimed to be loyal both to the United States and another country. He stated that if approached by the other country he would relocate there to offer his assistance, after resigning his U.S. position. Subject admitted that he would provide information obtained through his U.S. employment to the other country if he judged that this would not harm U.S. interests. Polygraph testing further resulted in Subject's admission to recent use of illegal drugs and two acts of shoplifting.

**83-7650****DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and authorized access to Sensitive Compartmental Information, was suspected of discussing highly classified information concerning a special project with unauthorized persons. During a personal interview he denied making any unauthorized disclosure. He displayed indications of deception during a subsequent polygraph examination. He later admitted that he had discussed with unauthorized persons details of the highly classified project on which he was employed.

**83-4600****ESPIONAGE**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a TOP SECRET foreign language translator position in the Intelligence Community, was polygraphed following a favorable background investigation. Subject was found deceptive to questions concerning contact with foreign intelligence services. During subsequent interrogation he admitted that he had been contacted by representatives of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service prior to leaving his native country. The foreign service provided him a system for clandestine receipt of instructions from them after he arrived in the United States. He signed an agreement with that service promising never to reveal this contact. Subject also admitted numerous contacts with the Soviet Bloc intelligence service in the months prior to entering the United States and clandestine contact in the pre-arranged manner after his arrival.

**83-4200****COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES**

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for a position within the Intelligence Community as a foreign language translator. A polygraph examination to determine his association with non-U.S. Intelligence agencies was scheduled after a background investigation for TOP SECRET clearance raised questions about his overseas travel. During a pre-examination interview, the Subject admitted that a relative was a member of the Armed Forces of a non-Western country. He omitted this from his application forms. The subject claimed he had no contact with anyone he knew or suspected to be a member of a non U.S. Intelligence agency. Polygraph testing failed to support his claim. The Subject subsequently admitted he had indeed talked while traveling to individuals who were representatives, possibly intelligence officers, of a non-Western government

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Date 7 May 85

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

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As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

Although it is not indicated in the minutes, SECOM's records reflect that this was the February 84 study. The question that remains is had the study actually been released?

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, clearances, and similar actions

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